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The Grand Unification Theory of Health Care

Appendix - Devising a methodology for open rationing

            C. Ethical implications of cost-effectiveness calculations 


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Grand Unification Theory of Health Care

- Contents -

INTRODUCTION

SECTION 1 - The importance of the doctor-patient relationship and why we can't have it anymore 

SECTION 2 - The truth about health care rationing

SECTION 3 - Health Care 2000 - how it got this way

SECTION 4 - Secrets of  managed care 

SECTION 5 - Portrait of a modern HMO

SECTION 6 - The Clintonians Strike Back

SECTION 7 - Rationing and Death - Covert rationing and end-of-life care

SECTION 8 - Fixing our health care system

APPENDIX - Devising a methodology for open rationing

Why the analysis of cost-effectiveness requires ethical guidance

In Section 8 and in Appendix B, we spent some time considering the ethical principles that ought to guide us as we design a system of open rationing.  Specifically, we discussed when it is and is not okay to include quality measures when ranking a particular health care service on a prioritized list.  We even derived three general rules (from the FCEO standard) that tell us when it is okay to use those quality measures.

Deciding on ethical principles and allowing those principles to guide us as we prioritize health care services is more than just “the right thing to do.”  It has a very practical value. 

It shows us how to do the math. 

This Section attempts to demonstrate how our ethical standards are applied directly to the formulas that determine cost-effectiveness, and therefore how those principles are translated onto our priority lists.

Cost effectiveness

Cost-effectiveness is the mathematical parameter that will most directly determine the position of a health care service on the priority list used in a rationing system like the one we’ve proposed.  Cost-effectiveness is a measure of the cost of a service in relation to some unit of its effectiveness (such as the Quality Adjusted Life Year, or QALY).  Further, it is important to realize that cost-effectiveness is not simply related to a single QALY measurement. Instead, cost-effectiveness is related to the difference in QALYs between two states of health.

To see this, consider the following equation for the cost-effectiveness of a therapy:

 

 

QALYrx  is the QALY that would be measured if the therapy being evaluated were used, and QALYnorx is the QALY that that would be measured if the therapy were not used.  Thus, cost-effectiveness is related to the difference in QALYs between using the therapy, and not using the therapy. The difference between QALYrx and QALYnorx is called the “QALY difference.”

When using this equation, cost-effectiveness is reported as “dollars per quality adjusted life year,” so that, for instance, hemodialysis might be reported as yielding a cost-effectiveness of $50,000 per QALY. The higher the cost-effectiveness value, the more expensive and the less efficient the therapy (per unit of effectiveness). The lower the cost-effectiveness value, the less expensive and more efficient the therapy. As we can see from the equation for cost-effectiveness, to improve cost-effectiveness for a therapy we must either lower its cost, or increase the “QALY difference” resulting from that therapy.

Since QALYs are a vital part of the cost-effectiveness calculation, let’s take a look at how they are computed.  As you will recall, the QALY is supposed to be a composite index that takes into account both the benefit (or harm) supplied by a therapy, and the duration of that benefit (or harm).  The measurement of benefit or harm is made by using some sort of a “quality of life” scale, such as the Quality of Well-Being (QWB) scale that was used in Oregon. 

In general, QWB scales report a numeric value representing the quality of life, for each of a set of “health conditions.”  One such health condition, for instance, might be “confined to a wheelchair.”  After a large number of patients are surveyed for their opinions on what life would be like with each health condition, each condition is assigned a value on a scale of 0 to 1, with 1 being perfect health and 0 being as good as dead.  So, for instance, the QWB for “confined to a wheelchair” might end up with a value of 0.5 – having to spend one’s life in a wheelchair might be judged as having only half the quality of perfect health.With these considerations, the formula for QALY is:

QALY = QWB x  probability  X duration

“Probability” is the statistical probability that the health condition related to the QWB will occur.  “Duration” is the expected duration of that health condition.   Assuming a therapy has a 25% chance of preventing a patient from having to spend the rest of his life in a wheelchair (a health condition that has a QWB of 0.50), and also assuming the patient has a life expectancy of 20 years, then the QALY for that therapy would be calculated as QWB x probability x duration = 0.5 x 0.25 x 20 = 2.5.

Note that a therapy might impact on several different “health conditions.”  For instance, a drug used for cancer chemotherapy might have a 25% chance of curing a particular type of cancer; but at the same time it might also have a 20% chance of causing severe nausea for up to six months, and a 5% chance of causing severe heart failure.  To compute a QALY for this therapy, one would have to total the quality effects of the drug related to all three health conditions (i.e., curing the cancer, producing nausea, and causing heart failure).  Such an endeavor is not trivial.

To illustrate, assume this chemotherapy was being contemplated for a 60 year old man, whose life expectancy if cancer is cured would be 18 years, and whose life expectancy were he to develop heart failure from the chemotherapy would be five years.

The essential data for calculating an overall QALY for this therapy in this patient is given in the following table:

Effect of therapy QWB value Probability Duration (years)
Curing cancer 1.0 0.25 18
Producing nausea 0.75 0.2 0.5
Causing heart failure 0.6 0.05 5

This table reflects the fact that the chemotherapy we’re considering for this patient has a 25% chance of curing his cancer (i.e., the probability of achieving this effect of therapy is 0.25).  Further, if the therapy does cure cancer, our patient will probably live another 18 years, and will have a “normal” quality of life (i.e., the QWB value for a cancer cure is 1.0). Therefore, contribution to the overall QALY calculation from “cancer cure” (the QALYcure) 1 x .25 x 18 = 4.5.  This means that for every patient like this one who receives this chemotherapy, we might expect to gain 4.5 quality-adjusted life years.

Unfortunately, our proposed therapy also has some detrimental effects.  It has a 20% chance of producing nausea for up to 6 months, and the nausea is so severe that the patient’s quality of life for that period of time will be significantly reduced. Indeed, the QWB score of .75 indicates that the presence of such nausea would make life itself worth only 75% of its usual value. Because the nausea, if it occurs, will reduce our patient’s quality of life by 25% for six months, the contribution of this “effect of therapy” to our overall QALY (the QALYnausea) is - 0.25 x 0.2 x 0.5 = - .025. 

Our proposed chemotherapy also has the propensity to cause heart failure.  In considering its effect on the QALY, we need to consider that this heart failure is fundamentally different from the nausea we’ve just discussed. Not only does the heart failure reduce the quality of life while the patient remains alive, but it also reduces the duration of life.  This difference requires a two-part calculation to assess the effect of heart failure on the overall QALY. It requires the calculation of a quality of life component, and a duration component.

The quality of life component contributed by the proposed therapy’s propensity to cause heart failure is calculated using logic similar to that used for nausea. There is a 5% chance our therapy will cause heart failure, which can be expected to persist for 5 years, and which will reduce the patient’s quality of life during that time by 40%. Thus, the calculation for the quality of life component is - 0.4 x 0.05 x 5 =  - 0.1. 

The need to calculate a duration component arises from the fact that, if a patient develops heart failure as a side effect of the chemotherapy, and if that patient would otherwise have been cured of his cancer, then in effect the heart failure will produce a reduction in survival of 13 years.  In other words, the heart failure will reduce the 18 years our patient could have expected to live with a cancer cure, to 5 years. This duration component is calculated as follows:

Pcancercure X Pheartfailure X Duration,

where Pcancercure is the probability that the cancer will be cured, Pheartfailure is the probability that heart failure will develop, and Duration is the reduction in survival caused by the heart failure.  This calculation thus becomes: 0.25 x 0.05 x 13 = 0.1625. 

The total contribution to the QALY resulting from the propensity of our therapy to cause heart failure (the QALYheartfailure) is the quality of life component plus the duration component, or 0.1 + 0.1625 = 0.2625. (We are assuming here that if the cancer is not cured, then the production of heart failure will not further reduce survival.)

Now we can calculate total QALY for the proposed chemotherapy as follows:

QALYrx  = QALYcure + QALYnausea + QALYheartfailure.  

(Remember that since “nausea” and “heart failure” detract, not add, to the quality of life, they are negative values, and will lessen the overall QALY.)  Thus, the QALY we could expect to achieve if we were to use this chemotherapy (i.e., the QALYrx,) is 4.5 - 0.025 - 0.2625 = 4.21.

We would next use the same methodology to calculate a QALYnorx, (the QALY score we would expect if we did not use the chemotherapy).  Assume we did this, and the answer we got was 0.82.  (The low QALY here is reflective of the fact that, without chemotherapy, early death would most likely ensue.) Thus, the QALY difference is 4.21 – 0.82 = 3.39.  This number reflects the difference in outcomes (as measured by QALY) between using and not using the chemotherapy.

Finally, we are ready to calculate the cost-effectiveness of this chemotherapy. If the cost of the chemotherapy is $50,000, then its cost-effectiveness would be: $50,000/ 3.39 = $14,749 per QALY.  The chemotherapy would cost society $14,749 for every quality-adjusted life year it gained us.  Considering that many commonly used treatments in medicine yield cost-effectiveness values in the tens of thousands of dollars, this therapy looks reasonably economical.

Note that, in this example, the relatively high cure rate provided by the chemotherapy along with the QWB score of 1.0 for a “cure,” strongly outweighs the relatively small negative contributions resulting from the possible side effects of severe nausea and heart failure.  The severe nausea, while a significant problem with an appreciable incidence, reduces the QALY only marginally because of its relatively short duration.  Severe heart failure has a significantly poor QWB and shortens life substantially, but because of its low probability, the magnitude of its contribution to the overall QALY is also relatively low.

This sort of calculation, while complex, is still eminently doable.  As long as we have reliable QWB values for a comprehensive list of medical conditions, values for the probabilities of the important effects of various medical therapies, and values for the duration of those effects, then we can easily calculate QALY scores for virtually any therapy we desire.

Ethical considerations in calculating cost-effectiveness

As we have seen, the ethical problem in designing a prioritized list of health care services centers around the issue of which quality measures to include in the cost-effectiveness calculation.

To see how ethical considerations create a problem, let’s re-examine the cost-effectiveness calculation for our 60 year-old cancer victim – but this time, let’s add a complication.  In addition to having cancer, assume he is now also confined to a wheelchair, and that we have decided to factor this disability into the QALY calculation.  Further, assume that the QWB for the health condition of being confined to a wheelchair has been determined to be 0.5.  If we cure his cancer, he will still have a life expectancy of 18 years, and the probability that we will cure his cancer with our chemotherapy is still 0.25. Thus, his QALY calculation for being confined to a wheelchair is 0.5 x 0.25 x 18 = 2.25.

The new QALYrx then becomes 4.21 (the previous QALYrx) minus 2.25 = 1.96; and the QALY difference (QALYrx – QALYnorx) becomes 1.96 – 0.82 = 1.14.  The cost-effectiveness in this case is $50,000/1.14 = $43,859 per quality adjusted life year.  Providing this chemotherapy to a patient confined to a wheelchair, then, looks far less economical than providing it to a patient who is not disabled.

We can thus easily see how factoring every underlying disability into a QALY score (i.e., the standard method) will always bias the resultant cost-effectiveness calculation against patients with disabilities. The federal government was right, in other words, to criticize the Oregon rationing plan as being in violation of the American Disability Act.

On the other hand, if we follow our FCEO standard, the quality adjustment for being confined to a wheelchair would not be used (from Rule # 1, since being wheelchair-bound has no relationship to the effectiveness of the chemotherapy), so for this patient the more favorable cost-effectiveness value would apply.  Thus, our ethical standards determine the results of the cost-effectiveness calculation, and thus determine the order of priority in rationing.

Implications of who determines quality of life. 

Another way that ethical standards impact on cost-effectiveness calculations has to do with the issue of who one surveys when the QWB values are being assigned.

Are patients being surveyed who have the condition being assessed, or are individuals being surveyed who do not have that condition?  This is an important consideration since, as is now well-recognized, patients who are living with a disability (paraplegia, for instance), tend to rank their own quality of life higher than would a person without that disability (who is being asked about her quality of life if she were to develop the disability). 

This fact has significant implications regarding the calculation of QALYs.  For instance, say we’re assessing a therapy that has the potential to prevent paraplegia.  If the QWB score for paraplegia is derived from a survey of people who actually have paraplegia, any treatment whose cost effectiveness is measured using that QWB score won’t look as efficient as it would if we had surveyed people who do not have paraplegia.  (This is because, since the QWB would be higher from a survey of people with paraplegia, the QALYnorx would also be higher. Therefore the QALYrx – QALYnorx  would be lower, and the results of a cost-effectiveness calculation for a therapy that prevented paraplegia would be less favorable.)

This example establishes a general rule.  If the QWB score for a disability is derived from a survey that includes patients who have that disability, then both the QWB and the QALY will tend to be higher than if the survey was derived solely from people who do not have that disability. This would mean that any therapy that cures, improves, or prevents that disability would end up with a relatively unfavorable cost-effectiveness value, and would thus be disadvantaged in a priority ranking. Conversely, a therapy that had, as a side effect, the property of causing that disability would end up with a relatively favorable cost-effectiveness value.  Thus, QWB values should be measured, whenever possible, by surveying patients who do not have the health condition being assessed.

It is important to note that this general rule only holds if the FCEO standard is to be used.  Recall that under the FCEO standard, the quality measures for a disability will not be included in the cost-effectiveness calculation for a treatment, unless that disability materially affects the results obtained with that treatment (see Appendix A). Under the more typical application of cost-effectiveness, however (i.e., if the FCEO standard is not going to be used), the quality measures for a disability would be included in the cost-effectiveness calculation, regardless of whether that disability affected the efficacy of the treatment. In this case, excluding patients with the disability from participating in the QWB survey would disadvantage them even further (since excluding them would result in a lower QWB score and a lower QALY score, and thus a less favorable cost-effectiveness calculation.)

Implications of including "duration" in cost-effectiveness calculations.

By definition, QALY measurements must factor in the expected duration of the benefits and harms of the treatment being considered.  We ought to be quite clear about what this means.

Sometimes, the duration of a benefit (or harm) is dependent only on characteristics of the treatment.  For instance, the duration of nausea caused by the chemotherapy in the examples we’ve been using is 6 months.  That value is purely a function of the chemotherapy itself.

However, in many cases the expected duration of a benefit or harm is directly related to the age of the patient in whom the therapy is being contemplated.  In the example of our 60-year-old patient, his life expectancy, judged to be 18 years if the cancer could be cured, featured prominently in the calculations of cost-effectiveness.  If this patient had been 30 years old, his life expectancy would have been nearly 50 years, and the cost-effectiveness would have calculated out much more favorably.

Most methods of computing cost-effectiveness, by including the expected duration of benefit in the calculations, are automatically biasing the calculations according to age.  While, according to the FCEO standard, it is ethically permissible to do this (based on the concept of total lifetime risk being equal for all individuals), it is not required that we do so. 

If we do decide to continue biasing cost-effectiveness calculations by age, we should not allow that fact to remain “hidden.”  Perhaps we should rename the process “age-adjusted cost-effectiveness.”  While such a term could legitimately be considered a redundant one, at least it lets everyone know exactly what’s being done.

If we decide not to let age become a factor in rationing health care services, then we will need to devise a new methodology for calculating QALYs.  For instance, the “duration” of benefit of a life-saving therapy might be assigned a standard value for all patients.  To do this will be seen by some as being more fair to the elderly; but in terms of the ideal of equalizing the lifetime opportunities of all individuals, others will see it as being unfair to the youthful. 

The point, once again, is that our ethical principles will determine our methodology for calculating cost-effectiveness, and therefore largely will determine how our health care services are rationed.  If we don’t specifically articulate those ethical principles, then the equations we use for doing our calculations will articulate them for us.

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